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INTRODUCTION 
 
An author is fortunate when his or her ideas are taken seriously, 
and I am particularly privileged to have had such an outstanding and 
diverse group of scholars coming from several different countries and 
specializing in various disciplines engage with so many of the issues 
 
 
∗
 Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights and Director, Program on Global and 
Comparative Constitutional Theory, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
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and ideas that I dealt with in my book, The Identity of the Constitutional 
Subject. It was a great pleasure to be able to react in person to the au-
thors whose ideas are presented in the preceding pages at the conference 
focusing on my book that took place at the Cardozo School of Law on 
October 25, 2010.1 I am also grateful for this opportunity to grapple in 
greater depth with the rich insights, incisive comments, and deeply chal-
lenging criticisms that emerged throughout the preceding contributions.2 
As these contributions collectively address many of the book’s facets 
from a number of different perspectives, it will be, of course, impossible 
to do justice to all of the valuable observations made and challenges 
raised. Accordingly, I will have to be selective. I will begin by briefly 
addressing my criteria of selectivity. 
My book zeroes in on the question of constitutional identity and its 
relation to its proper subject in the dual sense of: (1) who does, or can, 
appropriate that identity as his/her/its own; and (2) to whom can, or 
should, that identity be ascribed. The book, moreover, addresses these 
questions at a conceptual level and conducts its work at various levels 
of analysis ranging from the macroanalytic level3 to the microanalytic 
one,4 as well as at different levels of abstraction.5 Consistent with this, 
criticism could be addressed to the conceptual project or conclusions as 
a whole, or against parts of it at all or some levels of analysis or abstrac-
tion. None of the contributions explicitly attack the conceptual project 
as a whole, though criticisms directed at certain discrete parts of the 
project may be understood as posing significant challenges to the 
soundness or coherence of the project as a whole. For example, Deborah 
Hellman takes issue with my conception of equality6 and Seyla Ben-
habib criticizes what she considers a lack of sufficient emphasis on the 
role of democracy in relation to constitutionalism.7 Other challenges, 
such as that by Sujit Choudhry regarding one of the constitution-making 
 
 
1
 I wish to thank Cardozo’s dean, Matthew Diller, for suggesting and providing generous 
institutional support for the conference in question, as well as my colleagues, Peter Goodrich and 
Julie Suk, for their splendid realization and most successful organization of that conference. The 
conference was held under the auspices of the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy 
at Cardozo. I am grateful to the Center for hosting this project. 
 
2
 I wish to thank the Cardozo Law Review for inviting me to write this reply. Moreover, in 
addition to replying to the contributions made in the preceding pages, I will also address some of 
the criticisms made at the October 25 conference by Pierre Legrand and further developed in 
Pierre Legrand, Jacques in the Book (On Apophasis), 23 LAW & LITERATURE 282 (2011). 
 
3
 See, e.g., MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELF-
HOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITYchs. 1–2, at 17–70 (2010). 
 
4
 See id., ch. 3, at 73–126. 
 
5
 See, e.g., id. chs. 5–6, at 149–210 (discussing the construction of various constitutional 
models by comparing actual historical experiences at a certain level of abstraction). 
 
6
 See Deborah Hellman, Comments on Michel Rosenfeld’s The Identity of the Constitutional 
Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1839 (2012). 
 
7
 See Seyla Benhabib, On Michel Rosenfeld’s The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1889 (2012). 
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models I elaborate (labeled the “Pacted Transition Model”) bear upon 
extrapolations that figure in an attempt to frame a proper level of ab-
straction for analytic and comparative purposes.8 Bernhard Schlink and 
Jan-Werner Müller raise historical issues that have a bearing on im-
portant theoretical assertions, respectively the relation between the con-
stitution, the nation, and the state,9 and the contrast I draw between con-
stitutional and human rights patriotism.10 Peter Lindseth poses a broad 
methodological and theoretical challenge concerning my treatment of 
the prospects of viable transnational constitutions.11 Finally, Pierre 
Legrand reads my entire enterprise in a way that, though entirely plau-
sible, goes in part against the grain of what I intended to convey.12 By 
contrast, the remaining two contributions by Rosalind Dixon13 and Alec 
Stone Sweet14 seem to me consistent with the views I express in the 
book, and, at least as I read them, they also corroborate and further ex-
pand on certain of the conclusions that I reach in the book. 
Consistent with the above observations, I will proceed as follows: 
Part I will address the arguments of Hellman and Benhabib that go to 
some of the foundations upon which my theory of the constitutional 
subject is built. Part II will tackle comments and criticisms that call into 
question the particular level of abstraction at which I have framed cer-
tain models and theoretical constructs that rely on historical fact or legal 
and political analysis as they arise in the contributions by Choudhry, 
Schlink, and Müller. Part III will briefly concentrate on the methodolog-
ical and theoretical grounds on which I rely to engage in cautious specu-
lation about the future prospects of transnational constitutionalism in 
view of Lindseth’s criticisms. Lastly, Part IV will respond to Pierre 
Legrand’s reading of my book as a departure from my previous en-
gagement with Derrida, and thus as forsaking singularity in an overly 
eager move to achieve reconciliation. The relationship between the uni-
versal, the singular, and the plural has been a central focus of much of 
my work,15 and I will seek to stress contra Legrand that my dialectical 
 
 
8
 See Sujit Choudhry, Civil War, Ceasefire, Constitution: Some Preliminary Notes, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1907 (2012). 
 
9
 See Bernhard Schlink, The Constitutional Subject and Its Identity: My German Experience, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869 (2012). 
 
10
 See Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism Beyond the Nation-State: Human Rights, 
Constitutional Necessity, and the Limits of Pluralism, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923 (2012). 
 
11
 See Peter L. Lindseth, Constitutionalism Beyond the State? The Administrative Character 
of European Governance Revisited, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875 (2012). 
 
12
 See Legrand, supra note 2. 
 
13
 See Rosalind Dixon, Amending Constitutional Identity, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1847 (2012). 
 
14
 See Alec Stone Sweet, The European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitu-
tional Reordering, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1859 (2012). 
 
15
 See, e.g., MICHEL ROSENFELD, LAW, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CLASH OF CUL-
TURES: A PLURALIST ACCOUNT (2011) [hereinafter ROSENFELD, LAW, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY]; 
MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1998) 
[hereinafter ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS]. 
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approach to the relationship in question does not contemplate eliminat-
ing, overcoming, or circumventing singularity. 
 
I.     EQUALITY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 
 
Both modern constitutional identity and the question of its subject 
as they arose in the aftermath of the French Revolution bear an essential 
connection to equality and an indissoluble—though often problematic—
link to democracy. Modern constitutionalism arose in eighteenth-
century France and the United States upon the overthrow of feudal hier-
archy and the establishment of equality among all human beings as the 
new baseline for all intersubjective dealings—a shift encapsulated in the 
American Declaration of Independence’s dictum: “All men are created 
equal.”16 The embrace of the ideal of equality, however, bumped imme-
diately against the reality of the glaring inequality of women in both 
France and the United States—and in the latter against the bane of race-
based constitutionally enshrined slavery.17 It is in this context that I 
made reference to the dialectic of equality and of the three stages of 
which it is comprised, namely, (1) difference as (justifying) inequality; 
(2) equality as identity; and (3) equality as difference. This dialectic, 
while historically rooted in the case of women in both France and the 
United States (and of African Americans in the latter), is posited as an 
account of the logic, but not necessarily the history or politics, of the 
Enlightenment-based conception of equality. As a matter of fact, where-
as I consider the dialectical logic involved implacable, I have often in-
sisted that historical and political attempts to move from stage-two to 
stage-three equality can be fraught with dangers of regression to stage 
one.18 
The centrality of democracy in connection with modern constitu-
tionalism and the problematic relationship between the two is perhaps 
best captured by reference to the metaphor of the social contract, which 
figures prominently in accounts of the legitimacy of constitutions.19 If 
the constitution can be convincingly portrayed as the product of the 
mutual consent of all those meant to be subjected to its prescriptions, 
 
 
16
 See ROSENFELD, LAW, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY, supra note 15, ch. 2, at 68–91. The remain-
der of this paragraph draws on the much more extensive discussion of equality contained in these 
pages. 
 
17
 See David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism in America, in CONSTITUTION-
ALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 85 (Michel 
Rosenfeld ed., 1994) (arguing that conformity with the essentials of constitutionalism in the 
United States had to await the Civil War and the abolition of slavery). 
 
18
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 62 n.61. 
 
19
 See id. at 18–20. 
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then it stands as an ultimate product of democratic self-government. 
Moreover, under such ideal circumstances, a social contract–based con-
stitution would be thoroughly consistent not only with all plausible con-
ceptions of democracy, but also with full equality among all who, con-
sistent with Rousseau’s vision, would at once constitute themselves as 
the self-governing and the self-governed.20 The relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy is bound to become problematic, how-
ever, as actual circumstances can never sufficiently approximate the 
ideal ones evoked above. Thus, for instance, by its own terms, the U.S. 
Constitution only required acquiescence by a part of all those who 
would become subjected to its prescriptions upon its entering into 
force.21 More generally, even if a constitution were deemed to satisfy 
some appropriate criterion of democracy upon its inception—e.g., ratifi-
cation by a large majority, though not all of those to be subjected to it—
with the passage of time it would inevitably have to confront serious 
challenges from the standpoint of democracy. Why should my genera-
tion be bound by the consent given by the generation of my great-
grandparents’ grandparents? 
Constitutionalism’s problems with democracy are compounded by 
the fact that constitutional prescriptions are typically to a significant 
extent countermajoritarian. Inasmuch as democracy requires majoritari-
anism, countermajoritarian constitutional norms may appear downright 
antidemocratic, setting up seemingly insoluble conflicts between consti-
tutionalism and democracy. Upon closer examination, the interplay be-
tween constitutionalism and democracy seems even more complex and 
problematic. Indeed, some countermajoritarian constitutional provi-
sions, such as the protection of highly unpopular political speech, seem 
indispensable to the deployment and maintenance of genuine democra-
cy.22 On the other hand, other countermajoritarian rights, such as protec-
tion on privacy grounds of sexual practices found abhorrent by an 
overwhelming majority of the citizenry, seem downright antidemocrat-
ic. In short, how much democracy and of what kind there ought to be in 
the constitution (through the deployment of both majoritarian institu-
tions such as legislatures and counter-majoritarian guarantees such as 
protection of unpopular political speech) and to what extent the consti-
tution should afford certain protections against democratic rule are high-
ly contested questions. Moreover, the answers to these questions depend 
 
 
20
 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 5–18 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner 
Publishing Co. 1947) (1762). 
 
21
 See U.S. CONST. art. VII (providing that U.S. Constitution would become effective upon 
ratification in state conventions in nine of the then-existing thirteen states). 
 
22
 See Austl. Capital Television v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (Austl.) (holding by 
High Court of Australia that, in spite of a lack of bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, 
restrictions on certain speech before elections violated the constitutional protection of democratic 
self-government). 
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on the theory of democracy that one adopts. For present purposes, and 
with a view to responding to the comments and criticisms of Seyla Ben-
habib, suffice it to point out that the proper role and scope of majoritari-
anism in the context of democracy differs depending on the theory of 
democracy that one embraces. Accordingly, for some of those for whom 
majoritarianism plays a very extensive role in their conception of de-
mocracy, some countermajoritarian actions or policies may be obvious-
ly antidemocratic, whereas for others, with a much narrower view of the 
proper scope of majoritarianism within their different conception of 
democracy, the same actions and policies may well be deemed perfectly 
consistent with democracy. 
 
A.     Hellman and the Logic, Grammar, and Ideologies of Equality 
 
Hellman deems my views on equality both “somewhat peripheral 
to the overarching themes and claims of the book”23 and “unconvinc-
ing”24 for what I understand are two principal reasons: first, she finds 
my three-stage dialectic logic of equality mentioned above unhelpful, if 
not downright misleading;25 second, she objects to my placing relevant 
identities and relevant differences on the same plane, preferring a pre-
sumption in favor of linking equality to sameness.26 Moreover, Hellman 
advocates a conception of equality based on equal respect,27 and argues 
that my conclusions regarding the prospects for global constitutionalism 
are better supported under her conception of equality than under mine.28 
As may be already apparent, I strongly disagree with Hellman that 
equality is “peripheral” to the book’s central concern. Not only is mod-
ern constitutionalism unthinkable without equality, but it is difficult to 
imagine a constitutional identity (as opposed to a national identity) and 
a constitutional subject without reference to some conception of equali-
ty. With respect to Hellman’s objections to my treatment of equality, on 
the other hand, our differences as I see them boil down to questions of 
logic, grammar, and ideology. 
On the grammar of equality, I think Hellman is plainly wrong as 
she seems to blur the line between formal and substantive equality and 
as her introduction of a presumption of sameness as a structural matter 
rather than as an ideological choice seems to stem from a conflation of 
distinct levels of analysis. The distinction between formal and substan-
 
 
23
 Hellman, supra note 6, at 1839. 
 
24
 Id. 
 
25
 Id. 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 Id. 
 
28
 Id. 
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tive equality goes back to Aristotle29 and has been more recently ex-
haustively analyzed by Chaim Perelman.30 Formal equality requires that 
all those in the same essential category be treated the same and all those 
in different essential categories be treated differently. Regardless of 
who is deemed to be the subject of equality and what the domain of 
equality (i.e., what is to be apportioned equally) may be, all substantive 
conceptions of equality must comply with the immutable grammar of 
formal equality. Formal equality does not tell us what similarities and 
differences are relevant—only that all coherent substantive equality 
conceptions must perforce sort similarities and differences in terms of 
relevance and irrelevance. Thus, for example, formal equality is equally 
satisfied by the substantive conclusion that differences regarding repro-
ductive function between men and women are relevant for purposes of 
barring women from working outside the home and by the opposite 
substantive conclusion that differences in reproductive function are 
completely irrelevant in the context of access to employment outside the 
home.31 
Schauer’s view, as presented by Hellman, to the effect that “equali-
ty demands, at least prima facie, that like cases and different cases both 
be treated alike,”32 is patently absurd if taken at the level of the gram-
mar or structure of equality, for it would require that murder cases be 
treated like accidental death cases and racial discrimination cases the 
same as selecting the objectively best qualified candidate for a job over 
less qualified applicants. Schauer’s view, however, does make sense if it 
is understood as advancing a particular contestable substantive concep-
tion of equality stemming from a combination of a given ideological 
position combined with a practical concern. Given the history of use of 
differences that ought to have been irrelevant between the races and the 
sexes in the United States for purposes of invidious discrimination, it 
would be salutary and practically helpful to institute a presumption of 
irrelevance of differences to better eradicate once firmly entrenched 
prejudices. As a weapon to combat past injustices, Schauer’s presump-
tion is consistent with the quest to achieve a transition from stage-one to 
stage-two equality in the dialectical logic of equality that I have articu-
lated. What is contestable about Schauer’s presumption is his seeming 
preference for equality as identity over equality as difference. Indeed, as 
some feminists have argued critically in the American constitutional 
context, equality between the sexes usually requires that women con-
 
 
29
 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 112–43 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 
Penguin Books rev. ed. 2004). 
 
30
 See CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT (John 
Petrie trans., 1963). 
 
31
 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding state denial of right to practice law to 
women constitutional and justified in terms of women’s role as wives and mothers). 
 
32
 Hellman, supra note 6, at 1840. 
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form to standards tailored to the needs of men in order to be treated as 
equals.33 The point here is not to dispute Schauer’s or Hellman’s sub-
stantive equality preferences, but to underscore that they embrace one 
among several plausible contestable conceptions of equality all of which 
conform to the basic grammar and structure of equality. 
The dialectical logic of equality that I embrace and that Hellman 
rightly characterizes as having Hegelian roots34 is concededly more 
vulnerable to attack than my use of the distinction between formal and 
substantive equality. That is because the three-stage logic in question is 
construed based on abstraction from historical events and the history of 
ideas. And both history and the history of ideas are always open to rea-
sonable interpretive disagreements. Hellman’s objections, however, do 
not seem to take place at that level as she specifies that she agrees with 
my logic in the cases of racial equality and sex-based equality in the 
United States.35 What she does disagree with is my generalizing beyond 
these specific cases, and cites, for that purpose, the example of equality 
for those with disabilities as framed by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and its requirement of reasonable accommodation of disability.36 
Hellman correctly concludes that the Act in question is meant to pro-
mote stage-three equality in my scheme, but goes on to argue that there 
appears to be no stage one or two with respect to disability.37 Even if we 
were to concede that to be historically true it would not necessarily im-
ply that the logic at stake cannot extend to disability. The logic in ques-
tion may be derived from history, but it is meant to provide an explana-
tory and reconstructive conceptual function. Historical treatment of race 
and sex may be regarded as paradigmatic in this context, and the simple 
fact that some other difference does not share the same historical trajec-
tory is not conclusive one way or another. Even under the implausible 
assumption that disability was never noticed before the enactment of the 
relevant Act, it would seem perfectly coherent to analogize the case of 
disability to that of sex. Both sex and disability are immutable charac-
teristics on account of which no one should be disadvantaged. On the 
day before adoption of the Act, the disabled were in the exact same po-
sition relative to equality as women enjoying stage-two equality, and 
therefore the passage from stage-two to stage-three equality would fol-
low the exact same logic in both cases. In short, even if disability had 
traditionally been invisible so that it could not be susceptible to stage-
one equality treatment, that alone would not militate against the logic 
 
 
33
 See Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 32 (1987) (arguing that 
U.S. Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence posits men’s experience as the “norm” 
against which women are measured). 
 
34
 See Hellman, supra note 6, at 1840–41. 
 
35
 Id. at 1841. 
 
36
 Id. 
 
37
 Id. 
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under attack. Furthermore, beyond the conflation of levels, I think that 
the actual history of the treatment of disability hinted by Hellman is 
questionable. Disability has hardly been invisible, and once upon a time 
it certainly figured as grounds for invidious discrimination and for deni-
al of equal respect.38 Accordingly, it fits squarely within the paradigm, 
but even if it had not, it would still not upset the workings of the rele-
vant logic. 
Hellman seems to think that I have an unwarranted preference for 
equality as difference, which she highlights through suggesting that my 
theory would justify charging higher health insurance fees to battered 
persons.39 This seems the result of a general misunderstanding of the 
nature and scope of my theory. First, my theory is dialectical and the 
preference for equality as difference can only be understood in terms of 
a logical sequence where first certain differences that ought not have 
counted were wrongly used to deny equality to a class of people; fol-
lowed by the latter’s struggle to regain equality by hiding or underem-
phasizing those differences, and thus sacrificing the satisfaction of gen-
uine needs associated with the latter differences; and culminating with a 
guarantee of at once not being treated as unequals because of the differ-
ence in play while at the same being allowed to fulfill the needs deriv-
ing from that difference without fear of having that difference wrongly 
used against them. Moreover, the dialectic in question is focused pri-
marily on equality issues that have a significant constitutional dimen-
sion. Where the dialectic in question is either inapposite or the equality 
involved of little constitutional consequence, on the other hand, my 
theory does not require any prima facie preference for equality as dif-
ference. In the latter case, my substantive conception of equality just as 
every other one relies on a criterion for parsing out relevant from irrele-
vant differences. Whether to charge higher insurance fees to battered 
persons because they are almost certain to incur higher medical costs 
than otherwise similarly situated nonbattered persons depends on one’s 
substantive theory of distributive justice. My own theory, for what it is 
worth, is that it would be unjust to charge the battered person more be-
cause being battered is more akin to being genetically predisposed to 
having cancer than to choosing to smoke cigarettes and because I be-
lieve that society ought to insure against potentially prohibitive medical 
risks or conditions over which an individual can have no control. Fur-
thermore, given my theory in this context, my conclusion would be the 
same regardless of whether in the past, battered persons had been vili-
fied, glorified, or simply ignored. 
 
 
38
 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 
39
 See Hellman, supra note 6, at 1841. 
Rosenfeld.33-5.doc (Do Not Delete) 7/31/2012 8:59 PM 
1946 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 33:5 
 
B.     Benhabib and Iterations of Democracy 
 
As Benhabib herself notes, there is much congruence in our respec-
tive dialectical approaches.40 She nonetheless disagrees with my asser-
tion that it is conceivable, though by no means certain, that a global 
constitutional subject may emerge one day and that its identity would 
hinge on a combination of embrace of human rights patriotism with 
acceptance of constitutional necessity as an inescapable ubiquitous for-
mal and structural requirement of any working complex legal regime. 
Benhabib in essence objects to my conception of human rights and to 
what she considers my failure to properly account for the crucial role of 
democracy and self-government in the determination of human rights 
and constitutional particulars that happen to vary from one actual setting 
to the next.41 Accordingly, to my theory she offers “friendly amend-
ments,”42 the principal aim of which is to replace the concept of a global 
constitutional subject by that of “global subjectivities.”43 
I basically agree with Benhabib’s analysis of human rights, with 
her distinction between moral, political, and legal norms, and with her 
insistence on the indispensable role of democracy and self-government 
in the transition from free-floating universal notions of human rights, 
constitutional ideals, citizenship, and constitutional identity to concrete 
working instantiations of the latter within the confines of a working 
polity. What I disagree with, however, is that the thrust of her analysis 
actually belies or throws in grave doubt the possibility of a global con-
stitutional subject. Benhabib rightly emphasizes the paradoxes and con-
tradictions at the heart of human rights, constitutional arrangements, 
citizenship, and democracy, but, as I will seek to demonstrate below, 
her own conclusions need not necessarily follow from her analysis and 
my conclusions are not necessarily foreclosed by the latter, particularly 
if a certain plausible interpretive gloss is placed on some of her key 
insights. 
Before addressing Benhabib’s arguments directly, I wish briefly to 
address two essential points respectively about constitutional identity 
and the constitutional subject as I conceive them with the aim of placing 
the arguments that follow in their proper context. Constitutional identity 
originates as a lack that must be filled in an ongoing dynamic process of 
imagination through recombination and reconstruction of certain availa-
ble relevant materials.44 Moreover, how the lack of constitutional identi-
 
 
40
 See Benhabib, supra note 7, at 1890. 
 
41
 See id. at 1904–05. 
 
42
 Id. at 1890. 
 
43
 Id. at 1901. 
 
44
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 36. 
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ty is sought to be filled not only changes over time, but also generates 
disputes and rifts within the relevant polity at every moment within its 
trajectory. Thus, American constitutional identity is distinguishable 
from its French, German, or Canadian counterparts, but that does not 
imply that it is free of contradictions or that it is settled. For example, 
typical of American constitutional identity is the dispute over original-
ism in the context of constitutional interpretation.45 Originalists and 
nonoriginalists are locked into a dispute about a hotly contested element 
of American constitutional identity. There is nothing similar in Germa-
ny.46 Yet it would be misleading to equate the American nonoriginalist 
to a German counterpart who accords no particular preference to histor-
ical meaning in constitutional interpretation. That is because American 
constitutional identity as it pertains to the subject at hand is precisely 
circumscribed by the specific dynamic that pits the originalists against 
the nonoriginalists. 
Similarly, the constitutional subject is also the product of imagina-
tion, dynamic, unsettled, and most likely in important respects contra-
dictory. The constitutional subject is not a person or a group of persons, 
though it must channel its manifestations and iterations through persons 
assembled in plausible, even if not actual, configurations. The “We the 
People” that gave itself the 1787 U.S. Constitution amounted to an im-
agined projection that bore some connection to some of the population 
then residing in the thirteen states that had gained their independence 
from Britain and joined forces in a confederation delimited by the 1781 
Articles of Confederation and to the population that was to come in 
various successive waves of immigration throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and who would buttress the American constitutional 
subject through proclamation of loyalty to the U.S. Constitution as a 
precondition to obtaining coveted American citizenship. Consistent with 
this, for a global constitutional subject to make sense, it suffices that it 
can be imagined and plausibly linked to a possible configuration of per-
sons that could be reasonably understood to stand for humanity as a 
whole. Thus, for instance, in the face of an acute and potentially devas-
tating global environmental crisis, it seems entirely plausible to imagine 
a relatively small group of persons, who collectively represent all the 
significant views held throughout the world concerning the crisis and 
what to do about it, standing legitimately as “We the People of the 
Earth” in the quest for a partial, limited-subject global constitution 
providing an appropriate hierarchy of norms allowing for worldwide 
legal coordination to deal with vital environmental issues. 
Benhabib may well at this point object that my above characteriza-
tion of the “constitutional subject” reduces it to the equivalent of a 
 
 
45
 See id. at 33. 
 
46
 Id. 
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“constitutional subjectivity,” thus in effect revealing my acquiescence in 
her critique of the global constitutional subject. Without entering into a 
semantic debate concerning the distinction between “constitutional sub-
ject” and “constitutional subjectivity,” let me simply specify that I con-
ceive the global constitutional subject in the same terms as I do the tra-
ditional nation-state one. The claim that I intend to defend in what fol-
follows, therefore, is that if the constitutional subject makes sense in the 
context of the nation-state, then that subject could also find a place in 
the arena circumscribed by the globe taken as a whole. 
Benhabib focuses on two major paradoxes that lie at the intersec-
tion between constitutionalism and democracy. The first concerns con-
stitutional precommitment, which consists in part in binding the polity 
(in principle for many generations to come) to upholding antimajoritari-
an fundamental rights.47 The second paradox, in turn, relates to “demo-
cratic closure,”48 whereby membership in the polity through citizenship 
is inevitably determined by a set of actors that is to a significant extent 
numerically inferior to the set of those who will or should be included 
as members. More generally, democracy as government of the people, 
by the people, for the people, results in unavoidable gaps and lacks, and 
gives rise to a series of vexing paradoxes. Who exactly are the relevant 
people (as distinguished from the nation or those who happen to live on 
the polity’s territory)? When is consent, majority rule, or some antima-
joritarian norm or process necessary or sufficient for government to be 
of or by the people? Finally, what ought to count for purposes of satisfy-
ing the requirement that democracy be for the people given that in a 
constitutional democracy some, many, and even in some cases, most 
(e.g., a highly unpopular constitutional judicial decision) of the people 
are likely to be dissatisfied with governmentally generated or shepherd-
ed outputs?49 
Benhabib proposes to negotiate the two paradoxes she mentions 
through the process of “democratic iterations,” which she defines as 
complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange 
through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextu-
alized, invoked, and revoked, posited and positioned throughout le-
gal and political institutions as well as in the associations of civil so-
ciety. In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never 
simply produce a replica of the first intended usage or its original 
meaning: rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every itera-
 
 
47
 See Benhabib, supra note 7, at 1897. 
 
48
 Id. at 1897–98. 
 
49
 Cf. PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND 
JACQUES DERRIDA 120 (Giovanna Borradori ed., 2003) (discussing Jacques Derrida’s contrasting 
between democracy as “it is” and democracy “to come” (“à venir”), that is, between implement-
ing the rational will of the majority and the (impossible) fulfillment of democracy through equal 
treatment of the full singularity of every person within the global polity). 
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tion transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever so-subtle 
ways. The iteration and interpretation of norms and of every aspect 
of the universe of value, however, is never merely an act of repeti-
tion. Every act of iteration involves making sense of an authoritative 
original in a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is re-
posited and resignified via subsequent usages and references. Mean-
ing is enhanced and transformed . . . . Such democratic iterations take 
place today not only within boundaries of the nation-state but also in 
transnational public spheres of communication and action . . . .50 
I agree with Benhabib that “democratic iterations” can play a key 
positive role in handling not only the two paradoxes of democracy on 
which she focuses, but also all the others to which I have above briefly 
alluded. In other words, the best we can hope for in tackling the various 
paradoxes of democracy is to combine collective deliberation and col-
lective imagination, and to periodically punctuate the latter in some 
meaningful sense with actual expressions of acquiescence or endorse-
ment through elections, referenda, or other equivalent broadly participa-
tory events. 
Benhabib faults my treatment of human rights and my invocation 
of human rights patriotism for purposes of infusing the global constitu-
tional subject with content for failure to account for, or rely upon, a 
suitable occurrence of democratic iteration.51 Benhabib underscores that 
because the concept of human rights is a philosophically contested one, 
it gives rise to a number of competing and at times even contradictory 
conceptions.52 Because of that, argues Benhabib, one cannot effectuate a 
smooth transition from human rights conceived as universal moral pre-
cepts to human rights as embodied in particular constitutional rights 
with sufficient determinacy to become susceptible of political legitima-
tion and legal enforceability.53 Only through a dialectical process of 
democratic iteration can a political community capable of cohering into 
a constitutional subject elaborate over time a sufficiently particular and 
determinate conception of morally grounded rights to make the latter 
politically acceptable and legally usable to the community in question.54 
I fully agree with Benhabib’s analysis except for certain details 
concerning what I understand to be her conception of the nature and 
place of democratic iteration. Whereas I concur with Benhabib that 
democratic iteration is indispensable as a means of meaning endowing 
punctuation, I have a broader conception than she seems to regarding 
where and how democratic iteration can be successfully inserted to 
 
 
50
 See Benhabib, supra note 7, at 1899 (footnotes omitted). 
 
51
 See id. at 1901. 
 
52
 See id. at 1901–02. 
 
53
 See id. at 1902–03. 
 
54
 See id. at 1904–05. 
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achieve the requisite meaning-endowing punctuation. Moreover, based 
on this broader conception, I am persuaded that there is no unbridgeable 
gap between the national and the global constitutional subject, and that 
it is better to envision these two subjects as occupying different places 
within the same continuum. 
Human rights as they emerged in the 1948 Universal Declaration 
are primarily moral rights as opposed to the constitutional rights that 
issued from the 1789 French Declaration, which were primarily political 
rights.55 Furthermore, American constitutional rights were from the 
outset mainly conceived as legal rights.56 There would be a perfect 
alignment between the moral, political, and legal dimension of human 
rights (and all human rights would be constitutional rights57) in a global 
republic in which there would be a consensus on the moral meaning and 
import of human rights. In such a setting, the transition to the political 
and legal domains would be easy and seamless, and democratic iteration 
by an ideologically unified and politically undivided global constitu-
tional subject would be purely formal and seemingly perfunctory. 
Such a global republic is obviously pure fantasy, but, more im-
portantly, the perfect alignment attributed to the latter would be impos-
sible to approach even in the most unitary monoethnic, monocultural 
religiously and linguistically homogeneous present day constitutional 
democracy. Indeed, at the very least, any actual constitutional democra-
cy would necessarily be significantly divided along a recognizable polit-
ical spectrum and most likely prey to substantive disagreements con-
cerning important moral issues and concerning the optimal conception 
of human rights. Moreover, even in the unlikely event that the constitu-
tional subject of this minimally pluralistic modern republic coincided 
entirely in space and time with an exclusively jus sanguinis–based citi-
zenry, its constitutional identity would still not be static or monolithic. 
In short, even in this minimally pluralistic scenario, the passage from 
morals to law would require more than perfunctory democratic iteration. 
Would periodic majority endorsement suffice to legitimate contested 
resolutions of constitutionally relevant disputes? 
Whatever the answer to this last question, it seems obvious that pe-
riodic majority endorsement would amount to insufficient democratic 
iteration in the typical multiethnic, multicultural, religiously diverse, 
modern polity subject to large-scale immigration often from parts of the 
world with cultures very much at odds with those that have been tradi-
tionally rooted in the polity at stake. Most probably in the latter type of 
polity encased within the framework of the nation-state, the constitu-
 
 
55
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 253. 
 
56
 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 
57
 The converse, of course, would not be the case, as some plausible constitutional rights in a 
global republic may concern matters beyond the proper domain of human rights. 
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tional subject is an evolving one that does not neatly correspond to any 
set of persons crisply delimited in time and space. Moreover, in such a 
polity constitutional identity is likely to be a constantly evolving one 
that is significantly plural and at least in part contradictory as evinced 
by the American controversy over originalism. Finally, requisite demo-
cratic iteration in this context is likely to come from a combination of 
sources, including ones that do not fit within any traditional majoritarian 
mold or emulate the type of actual iteration involved in an election or 
referendum. Thus, for example, as paradigmatically antimajoritarian an 
institution as the judiciary may measurably contribute to democratic 
iteration to the extent that, as some commentators have claimed, there 
may be cases in which courts may better reflect public opinion than the 
elected branches of government.58 
Consistent with the preceding observations, the differences be-
tween the constitutional subject of a thoroughly pluralistic nation-state 
and that operating in a transnational or global setting appear to be more 
ones of degree than of kind. The nation-state constitutional subject is 
typically an all-purpose subject whereas its transnational counterpart 
may be a limited-purpose one. That difference, however, does not de-
tract from the fact that in both cases the construction of a suitable (con-
stitutional) identity requires negotiating through a series of convergenc-
es and divergences in order to build a coherent narrative that is 
punctuated by an adequate array of democratic iterations and that allows 
for a sufficient measure of unity within the constitutional subject as 
constructed and imagined, while giving sufficient due to the plural and 
often antagonistic conceptions of key moral, political, and legal norms 
at play within the polity. This account, moreover, is not purely utopian 
as it resembles the process whereby human rights as embodied in the 
European Convention of Human Rights are sought to be reconciled with 
the constitutional norms prevalent in the several states that have ratified 
that Convention. Pointedly, such reconciliation involves a dialogue 
among judges at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
and their counterparts sitting on national constitutional courts.59 Also, in 
this connection, judicial tools such as the proportionality principle or the 
margin-of-appreciation standard need not be turned into instruments of 
judicial fiat as they are inherently well suited for use as means for rec-
onciling the relevant axes of convergence and of divergence. Indeed, 
proportionality allows for systematic elucidation of poles of identity and 
poles of difference whereas proper use of the margin of appreciation can 
prove most helpful in determining how much plurality issuing from 
conflicting conceptions of human and constitutional rights can be ac-
 
 
58
 See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
 
59
 See Lech Garlicki, Cooperation of Courts: The Role of Supranational Jurisdictions in 
Europe, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 509 (2008). 
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commodated, hence facilitating democratic iteration without undermin-
ing the minimum unity of the relevant polity. 
 
II.     CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY, AND THE 
QUEST FOR THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF ABSTRACTION 
 
 On the one hand, the ideal of constitutionalism is too abstract to 
allow for fruitful comparison of different models of self-government, 
approaches to the rule of law, or configurations of fundamental rights.60 
On the other hand, each constitution and each constitution-making pro-
cess taken in its full concrete historical setting is too unique to allow for 
useful generalizations. Accordingly, constitutional models are likely to 
reach “their optimal heuristic potential at a level of abstraction situated 
at the midpoint between constitutionalism in the abstract and the actual 
concrete historical experiences that are inextricably weaved into the 
particular constitution(s) or constitutional constructs on which a corre-
sponding model is based.”61 
The contributions by Sujit Choudhry,62 Bernhard Schlink,63 and 
Jan-Werner Müller64 all raise questions concerning the actual level of 
abstraction at which fruitful extrapolation from actual historical experi-
ences may yield valuable insights into different constitutional models 
and the workings of constitutional ordering. Choudhry addresses the 
nexus between history and one of the models I propose directly whereas 
Schlink and Müller make what amount to more indirect historical chal-
lenges, in both cases regarding Germany, that raise questions both about 
navigation among levels of abstraction and about the models that de-
pend in part upon such navigation. 
 
A.     Choudhry, Civil War, Ceasefire, and the Pacted Transition 
Constitution-Making Model 
 
Choudhry asserts that most accounts of constitution-making either 
ignore or underestimate the important role that must be attributed to 
violence.65 On this, as he himself acknowledges, we both agree.66 
Whereas there is much in Choudhry’s analysis that I agree with, there 
 
 
60
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 151. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 See Choudhry, supra note 8. 
 
63
 See Schlink, supra note 9. 
 
64
 See Müller, supra note 10. 
 
65
 See Choudhry, supra note 8, at 1908–10. 
 
66
 See id. at 1910. 
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are two important assertions that he makes that pose a serious challenge 
to one of the constitution-making models that I put forth, the Pacted 
Transition Model,67 and which by extension raise questions about the 
methodology I rely upon in constructing my models. The first assertion 
in question is that constitution-making is best understood as being akin 
to negotiations in the context of a ceasefire after a civil war or in the 
hope of averting one in the future.68 The second assertion, in turn, is that 
I wrongly included South Africa within my Pacted Transition Model as 
the constitution-making experience in that country was far from peace-
ful, being instead mired in violence.69 
Choudhry’s first assertion meshes remarkably well with my con-
ception of a pacted transition constitution and, as I will detail below, 
actually allows me to further develop and enrich that conception. For 
that I am grateful to Choudhry and fully acknowledge my debt. I disa-
gree with Choudhry’s second assertion, however, not because I dispute 
his historical account of the South African experience, but because I 
believe that the implications he draws from it in terms of what is deter-
minative in the context of constitution-making are less persuasive than 
the ones I relied on in my determination that South Africa, like Spain, 
fit within the Pacted Transition Model. In other words, as I demonstrate 
below, when taken at the proper level of abstraction that provides an 
optimal window into what forces proved crucial in propelling and shap-
ing the course of the instance of constitution-making under scrutiny, the 
South African experience has much more in common with that of Spain 
than with those subsumed under any of the other models I discuss in the 
book.70 
Pacted constitutions are typically negotiated among parties who 
would prefer to impose their will on those who sit across them, but real-
ize that they lack the requisite overwhelming force and fear the prospect 
of protracted violence with an uncertain outcome. That was the case in 
Spain after the death of Franco, in Hungary and Poland at the end of the 
Soviet era, and in South Africa at the end of the apartheid era.71 Pacted 
transition negotiations are thus remarkably analogous to ceasefire nego-
tiations, with violence behind, in front, and beside those who feel 
pressed into compromise, even if somewhat painful, to avoid the com-
pound curse of bloodshed and uncertainty. As recounted in the book,72 
in post-Franco Spain, the memory of the bloody civil war almost four 
 
 
67
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 197–201. 
 
68
 See Choudhry, supra note 8, at 1917–18. 
 
69
 See id. at 1919–21. 
 
70
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 185–209. Arguably, South Africa may not fit under any 
of the models I advance. Because I believe that it fits squarely within the Pacted Transition Mod-
el, I will not address the desirability of turning to additional models. 
 
71
 Id. This discussion very briefly summarizes the account in the book. 
 
72
 Id. ch. 4, at 127–46. 
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decades old that left almost no Spanish family unscathed played a vivid 
role in bringing to the table the heirs of the civil war antagonists, those 
who favored the continuation of Francoism after Franco, and the politi-
cal descendants of the republicans of the 1930s, many of whom had 
recently returned from exile. The prospect of violence was also project-
ed into the future as would be proved by the failed military coup of Oc-
tober 1981, three years after the pacted Spanish Constitution went into 
effect. Finally, Basque terrorism irrupted intermittently during the last 
years of the Franco regime and well after the adoption of the 1978 Con-
stitution. Basque terrorism provided a dose of contemporary violence, 
reinforcing the pain associated with the past violence during the civil 
war and with the possible future violence should the pacted transition 
fail. The fear of Basque separatism (and for that matter even possibly 
Catalan separatism), moreover, also cast the Spanish pacted transition 
much as a ceasefire negotiation inasmuch as separatist violence loomed 
as a potential catalyst for a future civil war as much as a reprise of the 
conflict between Francoism and republicanism. Significantly, though 
the Basques did not directly participate in the constitutional negotia-
tions, they nonetheless acquiesced to having their interests brought to 
bear in the process through cooperation with the Catalans who were full 
participants in the constitution-making project. 
With an actual past civil war very much in mind and a potential fu-
ture civil war quite a plausible eventuality, the Spanish pacted constitu-
tion fits perfectly within the ceasefire-negotiation paradigm. Other pact-
ed transitions may not have been as overdetermined in this sense as the 
Spanish, but they nonetheless fit within the ceasefire metaphor to the 
extent that they involve violence in the past or future and genuine fear 
of an inconclusive outcome absent a negotiated solution. The ceasefire 
analogy thus reinforces and deepens the Pacted Transition Model, and 
this all the more so given that the analogy in question does not accord 
with the other models involving violence that I have elaborated in the 
book. It is not clear from Choudhry’s account whether he intends his 
ceasefire analogy to extend to all cases of constitution-making that in-
volve violence. In any case, I do not believe that the ceasefire analogy is 
apt in the Revolution-Based Model73 or the War-Based Model of consti-
tution-making.74 Indeed, in both these latter cases, constitution-making 
involves imposition of the will of a victorious party over a vanquished 
one with no or little negotiations in sight. To the extent that the eight-
eenth-century French and American revolutions were set against the 
 
 
73
 Id. at 188–91. 
 
74
 Id. at 194–97. The International Grounded Model, id. at 206–09, does involve ceasefires 
and pacted transitions under foreign prompting or supervision, and thus is to some extent analo-
gous to the Pacted Transition Model. Bearing this in mind, I will not further discuss the former 
model in the present context. 
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feudal order and the British colonizer respectively, the ensuing constitu-
tions did not involve negotiation or compromise and the ceasefire anal-
ogy would clearly seem inapt. 
Upon further consideration, actual constitution-making may be a 
complex, protracted process aimed at settling different accounts with 
different interlocutors. Accordingly, a particular constitution-making 
experience may partake in more than one constitutional model. This is 
well illustrated by reference to the making of the 1787 American Con-
stitution. The dominant moving force behind that constitution going 
back to the 1776 Revolution was rejection of, and differentiation from, 
the defeated British monarchy and its feudal underpinnings.75 One im-
portant issue that transcended the past relationship with Britain and 
could have proven a decisive obstacle in the path of the constitution in 
the making was the question of slavery that divided the southern states 
from their northern counterparts. The latter ultimately acquiesced to the 
acceptance of slavery in the 1787 Constitution in a pacted compromise 
that had all the earmarks of a ceasefire negotiation, particularly in view 
of the eventual civil war that would result in the abolition of slavery.76 
After the Civil War, transformative amendments, including the one 
abolishing slavery, were added to the 1787 American Constitution.77 
Taken at face value, these amendments coming at the end of a civil war 
may appear to involve ceasefire or pacted constitution-making. These 
amendments, however, were not really genuinely negotiated, but rather 
imposed by the victorious Union against the defeated states that had 
precipitated the War of Secession.78 Consistent with this, though the 
direct result of a civil war, when taken at the proper level of abstraction 
given the relative positions and roles of the relevant actors, the post–
Civil War Amendments seem better subsumed under the Revolution-
Based Model or the War-Based Model than under the Pacted Transition 
Model. 
Similarly, turning to Choudhry’s second assertion, even if the tran-
sition to a new constitution in South Africa during the 1990s was mired 
in much greater violence or threat of violence than Spain’s 1978 Consti-
tution or the then-recently concluded constitutional transitions in Hun-
gary and Poland, that transition was nonetheless clearly a pacted one. 
Neither the ANC nor the much weakened but still in power apartheid 
government was in a position to get its way without negotiation or com-
promise with the other. As a consequence, though each of the two par-
ties were weary of the other, with the white minority bent on preserving 
 
 
75
 See Richards, supra note 17, at 93. 
 
76
 See generally id. (providing a detailed account of the American Constitution from 1787 
until the adoption of the post–Civil War amendments). 
 
77
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (repealing slavery); id. amend. XIV; id. amend. XV. 
 
78
 See Richards, supra note 17, at 101. 
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as many entrenched rights as possible and the black majority eager for a 
prompt transition to full democracy, they jointly crafted an interim con-
stitution.79 Moreover, the latter constitution was negotiated subject to 
conforming to agreed-upon constitutional principles with the country’s 
Constitutional Court being set as the ultimate arbiter of compliance with 
the said principles.80 
 
B.     Schlink and the People of the State Versus the Nation 
 
Based on his assessment of German constitutional history, Schlink 
concludes that the German Constitutional Model is more complex than 
my account of it suggests,81 and asserts that German constitutionalism is 
less the product of constitutional or of national identity than of that of a 
people within a state or a Staatsvolk.82 In other words, consistent with 
my reading of Schlink’s narrative, it is the existence of a full-fledged 
functioning state and the imprint of those that make up its people that 
principally shape the constitution of the state in question, with national 
and constitutional identity playing a rather secondary role. And this is 
the case not only in Germany, but throughout Europe, as opposed to the 
United States.83 
Schlink’s account presents two principal challenges to my analysis. 
The first of these concerns what I have labeled the German Constitu-
tional Model,84 and is ultimately of relatively minor concern, as it could 
be overcome through renaming the model, which refers in substance to 
ethnocentric constitutionalism. The second challenge is much more 
troubling, however, as it calls into question the importance of constitu-
tional and national identity in relation to the state, the people, and the 
constitution. 
In designating the constitutional model in which the ethnos pre-
dominates over the demos as the German Model, I follow Ulrich 
Preuss,85 whom Schlink mentions in his above contribution.86 Moreo-
 
 
79
 See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC) at 39 para. 12 (S. Afr.). 
 
80
 See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 122 (2d ed. 2010). The South African Constitutional Court found the Interim Constitution to 
have fallen short of some of the agreed-upon constitutional principles. After that was remedied, 
the Constitution was finally approved and went into effect in 1997. Id. at 129. 
 
81
 See Schlink, supra note 9, at 1872. 
 
82
 See id. at 1872–73. 
 
83
 See id. at 1872. 
 
84
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 152–56. 
 
85
 See Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking in the New Polity: Some Deliberations 
on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 17, at 143, 148–50. 
 
86
 See Schlink, supra note 9, at 1869. 
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ver, I certainly do not disagree with Schlink that the current German 
Constitution departs in many significant respects from the ethnocentric 
model.87 However, in many other respects contemporary German con-
stitutionalism retains an ethnocentric orientation and this seems espe-
cially the case in the context of citizenship. This is reflected in the ac-
count provided in Benhabib’s contribution above88 and in the works of 
others.89 Be that as it may, the ethnocentric model is an important one 
and it is currently alive and well in countries such as Hungary90 and 
Croatia.91 Accordingly, the model in question could be preserved and 
renamed if, after careful review, Schlink’s thoughtful and insightful 
appraisal of the German constitutional experience proved most persua-
sive at the appropriate level of abstraction for the construction of consti-
tutional models. 
It is much more daunting to confront Schlink’s powerful case for 
the predominance of the Staatsvolk and to fit the unique case of German 
reunification, which he vividly recounts as a constitutional actor and 
keen observer within the framework of analysis I provide in the book. 
Whereas Schlink’s analysis touches upon deeper issues that deserve full 
airing, I will confine my remarks here to a determination of whether the 
Staatsvolk and the unique constitutional profile projected by German 
unification as presented by Schlink could be plausibly reconciled within 
my theoretical framework. 
In comparing the French, German, and American constitutional 
models, I claim that in the French, the state precedes the nation; in the 
German, the nation precedes the state; and in the American, the consti-
tution precedes both the nation and the state.92 These assertions are 
meant to be understood in the context of explaining the production of 
constitutional identity and of differences in the configuration and place 
of constitutional identity in various types of settings. From a purely 
functional standpoint, in contrast, all constitutions on the scale of the 
nation-state require a people, a nation, a state, and a constitution with 
the requisite features to bind the whole together into a polity that com-
ports with the essential attributes of modern constitutionalism. All na-
tion-state constitutions thus require a state framework, a collectivity 
plausibly cast as a people, and an imagined community of interests and 
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 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 154. 
 
88
 See Benhabib, supra note 7, at 1895–96. 
 
89
 See, e.g., ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
(1992). 
 
90
 See European Comm’n for Democracy Through Law [Venice Comm’n], Opinion on the 
New Constitution of Hungary, 87th Sess., Opinion No. 621 (2011), available at http://www.
venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL-AD(2011)016-E.pdf. 
 
91
 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA Dec. 22, 1990, pmbl. 
 
92
 See ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 149–63. The following discussion draws upon the analy-
sis provided in the cited pages. 
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purpose that can cohere into a nation. With this in mind, in the French 
case, the state preceded the nation inasmuch as the absolute monarchy 
had entrenched a powerful functioning centralized state within a well 
delimited territory that, though it required transformation to serve the 
purposes of a parliamentary democracy, proved very useful in anchor-
ing a nation in the making and in paving the transition from the subjects 
of the King of France to the French people. Similarly, in the United 
States, the 1781 Articles of Confederation erected an albeit insufficient 
and inadequate national confederal state and those behind the “We the 
People” of the 1787 Constitution’s Preamble set in motion the rudi-
ments of peoplehood and planted the seeds of a nationhood that would 
transcend the several distinct visions generated within each of the thir-
teen confederated states. Under these circumstances the constitution 
preceded the nation and the state as it furnished the blueprint for their 
transformation, implantation, and evolution. 
Does Schlink’s account of the German state and the German peo-
ple coming before the German nation and the German Constitution nec-
essarily contradict my assertion regarding the German Constitutional 
Model and the type of constitutional identity associated with it? I think 
not, based on at least one plausible interpretation of the key relationship 
between the Staatsvolk and the German nation. Before proceeding any 
further, however, it is necessary to briefly focus on the difference be-
tween the people and the nation that Schlink’s narrative brings to the 
fore. The people is the self-governing collectivity that unfolds its politi-
cal will within the confines of a particular state; the nation, in turn, is 
the imagined community or, in Max Weber’s expression, the “commu-
nity of sentiment”93 that bonds together to forge a common political 
destiny. In many cases, the people and the nation completely overlap, 
and the nation provides the people with a common identity that furnish-
es substantive content to self-government. Thus, the French people and 
the French nation as well as the American people and the American 
nation seem for all practical purposes coextensive. There are also multi-
national states, such as Spain, in which the state does not coincide with 
a single nation—it includes Basque and Catalan nationals among oth-
ers—and in which the people is made up of persons belonging to differ-
ent nations.94 In the case of Germany as depicted by Schlink, in con-
trast, the people and the nation do not coincide because significant 
numbers of German nationals are cut off from their German counter-
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parts within the German state who alone can function as the German 
people through self-government within their own state. 
Specifically, Schlink states: 
We Germans were members of the German Reich long before we 
had a modern German constitution . . . . What constitutes the collec-
tive identity of those living in the Federal Republic of Germany is 
first of all the Federal Republic of Germany as the state in which 
they live, which has its identity as a state since 1871, which has a na-
tional tradition and a modern constitution, but which has been small-
er than the nation and has had constitutions that had little in common 
with modern constitutionalism.95 
The key to reconciling my assertion that in the German Model the 
nation precedes the state with Schlink’s emphasis on the priority of the 
state turns on the import from the standpoint of constitutional identity of 
Schlink’s observation that the original German state created in 1871 
was “smaller than the nation.” Was it smaller by design or by necessity? 
If it is the latter, then Schlink’s narrative does not contradict my posi-
tion. Indeed, in that case it seems entirely plausible that the German 
nation preceded the German state and that German statehood would 
have ideally encompassed the entire German nation. However, given the 
impossibility of achieving that, having a German state that could house 
most but not all German nationals became the best possible alternative. 
Moreover, in the context of that alternative, German peoplehood had to 
be inevitably restricted to the German nationals found within the con-
fines of the new state. Finally, consistent with this interpretation, what 
endows the Staatsvolk with a sufficiently thick and concrete identity to 
allow German self-government to acquire a full substantive dimension 
is its inextricable link to the key attributes, concerns, and aspirations 
embedded in the German conception of nationhood. 
Consistent with the above interpretation, it is also possible to give 
a plausible account of the seemingly puzzling unification of East and 
West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 without the East 
Germans first adopting a new constitution or requiring that the (then) 
West German Basic Law be jettisoned in favor of a new joint constitu-
tion. As Schlink recounts the events, it is clear that before reunification, 
East and West Germany were two states with two people.96 But as 
Schlink emphasizes, “[d]uring the revolution the slogan ‘We are the 
people’ had increasingly been accompanied by another slogan, ‘We are 
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one people,’ and many citizens of the GDR expected . . . that one day 
eastern and western Germany would reunite.”97 
One plausible interpretation for this rapid evolution from the asser-
tion of East German peoplehood to that of united East and West Ger-
man peoplehood is that the glue that allowed the process of integration 
to go so swiftly was a common German nationhood, that while re-
pressed somewhat and for different reasons in both Cold War Germa-
nys, remained a powerful source of inspiration for the reinstatement of a 
commonly shared community of sentiments and of interests. Indeed, 
without common national origins, whereas the attraction of the West 
German Basic Law may have been strong and influential, it may have 
inspired a separate East German Constitution, but not submission by the 
GDR people to it. After all, the Basic Law was certainly an inspiration 
to many other former Soviet east/central European countries,98 but one 
would not expect the Hungarians or the Czechs to simply join in with 
the West Germans. 
 
C.     Müller and the Contrast Between Constitutional and  
Human Rights Patriotism 
 
Müller is critical of my reliance on human rights patriotism as a 
potential pillar of supranational, let alone, global constitutionalism, and 
he suggests that constitutional patriotism properly understood can per-
form the function that I reserve for its human rights counterpart.99 Mül-
ler’s analysis, moreover, focuses primarily on the European Union 
(EU), a supranational entity that, according to him, “does have a de 
facto constitution.”100 Relying on a conception of constitutional patriot-
ism that departs significantly from the influential views on the subject 
advanced by Habermas, Müller argues that such patriotism can play an 
important role today in the context of both national and supranational 
constitutions.101 In addition, turning an argument often made against 
Habermas’s invocation of constitutional patriotism toward my sugges-
tion that human rights can elicit passionate commitment, Müller ex-
presses strong skepticism concerning the prospects of human rights 
being a major moving factor in the deployment of transnational consti-
tutions.102 
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I will limit my comments on Müller’s critique to two points and 
then briefly compare his theory to mine concerning two recent constitu-
tional developments that have had an impact on the constitutional status 
of the EU that Müller alludes to and that took place after I completed 
my book. The two points relate respectively to his conception of consti-
tutional patriotism and to his claim that my notion of human rights pat-
riotism “falls victim to the misguided search for political objects fit for 
passionate attachment and fervor.”103 The two recent developments 
mentioned by Müller, in turn, are the new illiberal Hungarian Constitu-
tion that went into effect in January 2012104 and the crisis of the euro 
afflicting the EU at this writing.105 
Müller insists that his conception of constitutional patriotism does 
not rely on emotional attachment. Instead, in his own words: 
It ideally involves a much more reflective attachment and, crucially, 
a critical—and, above all, a self-critical—stance, which never takes it 
for granted that universal liberal-democratic norms and values have 
been successfully instantiated in any given constitution. It is not all 
about affirming a given constitutional settlement . . . but also about 
contesting such a settlement in the name of norms and values that are 
as yet imperfectly realized. . . . [O]ne might say: constitutional patri-
otism resembles a journey more than a home.106 
Müller illustrates the positive work that his version of constitution-
al patriotism can achieve by focusing on the political and constitutional 
challenges posed by multiculturalism both within and beyond nation-
states.107 As he sees it, in the context of multiculturalism, constitutional 
patriotism prescribes adherence to “liberal-democratic norms and val-
ues” without requiring the citizenry as a whole to embrace the same—
presumably majority—culture.108 In other words, liberal constitutional-
ism should be pressed as an antidote to identity-based fragmentation 
predicated on a clash of cultures—a clash that appears present both at 
the national and supranational level. 
Leaving aside any clash over labels, at least in the case of multicul-
tural polities, what Müller prescribes has all the earmarks of a particular 
iteration of constitutional identity. Constitutional identity is in part the 
product of negation, and at times must be set against other relevant 
identities including dominant or minority cultural identities to preserve 
the unity and integrity of the constitutional subject.109 Minimizing the 
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constitutional importance and impact of cultural strife is certainly a 
worthy and legitimate objective in certain multicultural settings. This, 
however, cannot be simply achieved through reflective adhesion to lib-
eral norms. To be meaningfully integrated into a working constitutional 
order, the liberal norms in question must be particularized and fitted to 
the actual fragmentation threats of the individual polity involved. Large 
scale Muslim immigration in a western European democracy does not 
necessarily pose the same challenges to liberal values that the rise of 
Christian religious fundamentalism as a political force in the United 
States or the identitarian claims of indigenous populations in countries 
such as Australia or Canada do. In short, what Müller refers to as consti-
tutional patriotism could only do what he prescribes for it if it could be 
successfully particularized through becoming embedded in an existing 
and evolving constitutional identity. 
Concerning human rights patriotism, Müller’s claims boil down to 
the following two propositions: we see no evidence of it in the context 
of the EU; and, emotional attachment to human rights as a moving force 
in the context of instituting viable constitutional regimes is highly un-
likely if not downright absurd. As to the first of these propositions, Mül-
ler may well be framing the inquiry far too narrowly. As he himself 
writes, “[h]uman rights patriots might find many good things to say 
about the European Court of Justice and the European Charter, but is the 
EU really plausible as a particularly great champion of human rights, or 
even of a particularly European understanding of human rights . . . ?”110 
I would simply reply that although not all countries that are signa-
tory of the European Convention of Human Rights (and hence subject to 
the decisions of the Strasbourg Court) are members of the EU, all EU 
members are subject to the Convention and the Court. Accordingly, it 
seems logical to infer that whatever human rights patriotism emanates 
from the Convention and from Strasbourg should be considered incor-
porated in substance in the EU’s de facto constitution. 
Turning to Müller’s second proposition, I share his view that atti-
tudes to human rights or constitutions for that matter have nothing in 
common with purely emotional patriotism such as becomes manifest 
during soccer matches among national teams or the singing of national 
hymns one has cherished since childhood. Nevertheless, I believe that 
human rights can give rise to the kind of emotions that prompt to action. 
Those emotions need not be contrary to reason, but it is difficult to im-
agine taking action to combat systematic violations of human rights in 
the absence of some empathy for the victims combined with outrage at 
the gross injustices and depravations of basic dignity to which they are 
being subjected. 
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It is certainly true that emotions such as those just alluded to can 
and do also arise in relation to egregious violations of domestic consti-
tutionally protected fundamental rights. In the latter case, however, the 
focus remains within the nation-state whereas in the international-
human rights context both the concern and the call for action are often 
transnational. Also, even if the reaction to violations of fundamental 
rights within the nation-state and the commitment to the values that 
such rights embody were properly deemed to be akin to patriotism, this 
would result in fundamental-rights patriotism but not by the same token 
in constitutional patriotism. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the same kind 
of emotion would attach to structure of government issues as would to 
those regarding fundamental rights. In sum, human rights patriotism 
makes sense in a way that constitutional patriotism cannot and, at the 
same time, human rights patriotism seems particularly well suited to 
transport constitutional norms and values across national boundaries. 
The two recent developments, namely the new illiberal Hungarian 
Constitution and the euro crisis to which Müller refers to bolster his 
theory,111 can also be interpreted so as to conform to, and bolster, my 
own theory. The new Hungarian Constitution poses a challenge to the 
EU constitutional order and highlights a seeming paradox or contradic-
tion within it. To gain admission to the EU, an applicant must comply 
with the essential dictates of liberal constitutionalism.112 If a country 
abandons, or retreats very significantly from, liberal constitutionalism 
after admission into the EU, however, the EU possesses no constitution-
al or constitutional-like113 tools to force a return to liberal constitutional-
ism. At one level, this looms as a constitutional design flaw that could 
be remedied by adopting a treaty or constitutional provision much like 
the U.S. Constitution’s Guarantee Clause whereby the federal govern-
ment must guarantee republican government within each federated 
state.114 On another level, in contrast, human rights patriotism—via 
Strasbourg or otherwise—could be garnered to put pressure on Hungary 
to reverse its illiberal retreat from human rights protection. 
The euro crisis, on the other hand, has revealed that the EU lacks 
the requisite constitutional institutional mechanisms to allow for orderly 
handling without being relegated to ad hoc politics at times more remi-
niscent of traditional foreign relations among independent countries 
than to regularly channeled dealings within a common supranational 
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project.115 In this respect, the EU lacks the kind of constitutional provi-
sions designed to coordinate currency management with economic regu-
lation typically found in nation-state constitutions.116 Moreover, this 
lack illustrates the need for what I have termed “constitutional necessi-
ty.”117 Presumably, all governing entities that exercise control over a 
currency, whether the countries within the eurozone within the EU act-
ing jointly or individual nation-states, require a constitutional frame-
work and corresponding constitutional norms that would allow for pro-
ceeding in a cogent and orderly manner. And this is a matter of logic, 
not of emotion. 
 
III.     A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE: CONSTITUTIONAL VERSUS 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Focusing on the EU, Lindseth disagrees with my views on consti-
tutionalism beyond nation-states and argues for his theory that the EU 
should be regarded as an administrative transnational order that draws 
its constitutional legitimacy exclusively from the several nation-state 
constitutions of the EU member states.118 I disagree with Lindseth, and, 
apparently, so do at least two of the contributors above: Müller, who, as 
we have seen, asserts that the EU has a de facto constitution;119 and 
Stone Sweet, who claims that the “European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) is . . . quickly evolving into a transnational, constitu-
tional regime.”120 Moreover, as emphasized above, the ECHR is a 
transnational regime that extends throughout the EU, even if the EU 
itself is not a signatory.121 I have already expanded on the basis for my 
disagreement with the claim that transnational regimes can dispense 
with a constitutional source of legitimation that operates at a transna-
tional as opposed to a purely national level,122 and I do not intend to 
repeat my arguments here. What I do wish to concentrate on, however, 
are certain methodological issues that Lindseth raises and that lead him 
to claim that his conclusions are warranted and mine not. 
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Lindseth contends that my focus on the conceptual plausibility of 
the implantation of a supranational constitutional order is flawed be-
cause I do not take a proper account of the historical, functional, politi-
cal, and cultural factors that relate to institutional change and the com-
plexities associated with reconciling all of the latter.123 Specifically, 
Lindseth charges that “[t]he failure to move beyond conceptual plausi-
bility to sociohistorical analysis . . . strikes me as the greatest weak-
ness . . . of Rosenfeld’s new book.”124 Furthermore, Lindseth identifies 
himself as a historian125 in connection both with his criticism of my 
methodology and of his conclusion that the EU is an administrative 
regime with constitutional backing in the EU member states national 
constitutions. 
As Lindseth himself indicates, it is not for historians to specu-
late.126 I, on the other hand, admit that I speculate, and that we do not 
now possess a historical record regarding transnational constitutional 
ordering comparable to that regarding constitutional functioning at the 
nation-state level. Contrary to Lindseth’s intimation, however, I do not 
engage in detached philosophical speculation to determine whether a 
transnational constitution is plausible in any possible world. Methodo-
logically, throughout the book I do relate the concepts I examine to rel-
evant social, historical, ideological, cultural, and functional factors, not 
as a historian, to be sure, but from the standpoint of political and legal 
theory. Some of my analyses focus on past trends127 or historical occur-
rences,128 others on current trends and events such as those in play in the 
context of the EU. Throughout all these analyses, I have endeavored to 
search for concepts and conceptualizations that might be helpful to un-
derstand meanings, trends, changes, conflicts, contradictions, etc., in the 
context of legal and political theory. In the case of the EU, as Lindseth 
himself admits,129 we have constitutional or constitutional-like norms, 
but the order of which they are a part does not fit within any of the 
proven models of the past. From a constitutional standpoint the EU is 
sui generis and whatever its constitution is, or may become, it does not 
fit within the model of the hierarchical unitary constitution typical of 
Westphalian nation-states. Moreover, there are now other at least partial 
constitutional orderings that are transnational in scope, the ECHR being 
one of them, and all these developments taken together justify inquiring 
into whether traditional concepts and conceptions of constitutional or-
dering are still adequate for purposes of best understanding important 
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evolving historical changes. It is in this context that I have speculated in 
the sense of venturing educated guesses based on all the relevant exist-
ing conditions and positing plausible future scenarios or trends that 
could vindicate fruitful new conceptions of constitutional ordering. 
The difference between a historian and a political theorist is that 
whereas they both engage in interpretation of the past, the historian 
must refrain from making predictions about the future, but the political 
theorist need not be so restrained. For example, if both the historian and 
the political theorist agree from studying past instances that in periods 
of economic growth the political party in power will win reelection, the 
political theorist, but not the historian, may generalize her finding and 
predict that the correlation will hold in the future. With this in mind, it 
is not clear to me whether at bottom Lindseth believes that my history is 
wrong or my political theory is unpersuasive. From my perspective, 
however, either Lindseth’s historical conclusions are wanting, or, in the 
end, he engages in the same kind of speculation as I do, in which case 
we both advance essentially contestable positions. 
On the historical front, there is much evidence that runs counter to 
Lindseth’s conclusion that the EU’s constitutional ordering is exclusive-
ly grounded in, and legitimated by, the national constitutions of the 
member states. First, the proposed EU Constitution, crafted through a 
broadly encompassing consultative process involving both national 
governments and legislators and many civil society actors, was ap-
proved by all twenty-five EU member states in 2004, and though even-
tually rejected by referenda in 2005, its substance was, for the most part, 
included in the Treaty of Lisbon approved by all twenty-seven members 
of the EU in 2007.130 Second, the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) has acted 
for decades, in part, as a constitutional court.131 Already in 1962, the 
ECJ upheld an action by Dutch citizens against their own state for im-
posing—in conformity with the Dutch Constitution—a legal duty in 
conflict with the EC (the predecessor of the EU) Treaty. In its holding 
in favor of the citizens, the ECJ stated: 
The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights . . . and the subjects of which comprise not only 
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legisla-
tion of Member States, Community law not only imposes obligations 
on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which 
become part of their legal heritage. . . . According to the spirit, the 
general scheme and the wording of the . . . Treaty, [it] must be inter-
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preted as producing direct effects and creating individual rights 
which national courts must protect.132 
Third, currently the EU confers citizenship that bestows political 
rights both at the level of the EU, as EU citizens have the right to vote 
in elections for the EU Parliament, and at the level of member states, as 
EU citizens who are also citizens of one of the member states but reside 
in another have a right to vote in the latter’s local elections.133 
The above list is only partial, but it suffices to compel a nonspecu-
lating historian to recognize that the EU has a constitutional dimension 
of its own, even if it is not as full as that of its nation-state counterpart 
or securely enough implanted to warrant confidence in its future consol-
idation or survival. Consistent with this, moreover, I think it fair to infer 
that Lindseth’s conclusion concerning the administrative nature of the 
EU is better understood as the work product of a legal or political theo-
rist rather than that of a historian. Because of this, Lindseth’s theory is 
in the end on the same plane as mine, and, as such, they are both con-
testable. Each of us, of course, is convinced that his own theory is the 
better one and it is ultimately up to every person who undertakes to 
compare the two theories involved to decide for him- or herself which 
of the two theories is more persuasive. 
 
IV.     THE UNIVERSAL, THE SINGULAR, AND THE PLURAL 
 
The notion of identity may connote community, unity, and harmo-
ny. By characterizing constitutional identity as a lack, I have sought to 
dispel any implication that the dialectical tension between the universal, 
the singular, and the plural may be eventually overcome in any defini-
tive manner through a Hegelian process of Aufhebung. Pierre Legrand, 
however, suggests that my book “aims for a contemporary Aufhebung, a 
muffling of difference making for some form of constitutional tranquili-
ty and unanimity, of composition and unity.”134 Legrand reaches this 
conclusion after highlighting my lack of reference to Derrida in the 
book—an omission he finds remarkable given my extensive past en-
gagement with the latter’s works.135 Legrand further surmises that the 
reason Derrida is absent in my book is because, as a U.S. constitutional-
ist, I am chiefly preoccupied with reconciliation, given the profound 
split among American constitutionalists between those who advocate 
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for an exceptionalist vision shut off from foreign influences and those 
who embrace a cosmopolitan attitude.136 
Leaving aside autobiographical speculation and glossing over dif-
ferences I might have with Legrand regarding his reading of Derrida, I 
wish to emphasize my disagreement with Legrand’s interpretation of 
my project. I view this as particularly important to the extent that 
Legrand suggests that I am after a synthesis between the universal, the 
singular, and the plural, when, in fact, I see all three as being engaged in 
an ongoing dialectical struggle with no end in sight. What Legrand de-
scribes as “reconciliation,” “tranquility,” “unanimity,” and “unity” 
amounts to sequences of imaginary projections forged through interpre-
tive juxtapositions relying on negation, metaphor, and metonymy. The 
constitutional subject is never fixed or stable and its identity appears 
tied to a seemingly perpetual sense of lack. 
Legrand relies on writings by Derrida focusing on an unbridgeable 
gap between self and other, the impossibility of capturing the other’s 
singularity, and the infinite irreducibility and heterogeneity that pre-
vents forming a single community that encompasses self and other.137 
Even if one shared this view on an ontological plane—as complete be-
ings, self and other can never escape alienation from one another as 
bearers of mutually irreducible singularity—what consequences would 
necessarily follow from that? I have long rejected the position that onto-
logical isolation need result in ethical, legal, or political impossibility to 
develop genuine concern for the other, and to form albeit imperfect and 
precarious legal and political alliances and commonly shared pro-
jects.138 If we postulate that ethical concern is what prompts the quest to 
live in community rather than isolation, then imagining the constitution-
al subject and endeavoring to draw a constitutional identity—inevitably 
subject to repeated erasures and constantly calling for redrafting—
figures as the political and legal expression of the need to persist and to 
engage with those who will to a significant degree remain irreducibly 
other. 
Unless a dichotomy is maintained between ontology on the one 
hand, and ethics, politics, and law on the other, one seems condemned 
to nihilism or radical relativism. As I read him, Derrida himself differ-
entiates between ontology and ethics to which his writings on justice, 
friendship, and hospitality attest.139 Derrida’s own acceptance of the 
dichotomy under consideration is perhaps best illustrated by his reaction 
to global terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Whereas 
Derridian deconstruction posits all communications as open-ended and 
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susceptible to a multiplicity of meanings, he refers to the 9/11 attacks as 
“unspeakable” and devoid of all meaning.140 In other words, for Derri-
da, unlike global terrorism, which signifies a complete rupture between 
self and other, all other forms of interaction imply the possibility of 
finding some meaningful common ground in spite of the ultimate irre-
ducibility of each person’s singularity. Accordingly, it is within the 
space opened up by the latter possibility—as small and narrow as it may 
be—that the constitutional subject aims to leave its mark through elabo-
ration of a constitutional identity. 
Going beyond Legrand’s concerns, my project situates itself 
somewhere between Derrida’s ethics of difference and Habermas’s eth-
ics of identity.141 Radical hermetically sealed singularity makes any 
cogent constitutional project impossible; thorough and permanent iden-
tity between self and other, on the other hand, would make constitution-
al projects superfluous as universal constitutional essentials would be 
self-imposing and beyond dispute. The constitutional subject and consti-
tutional identity become intriguing, problematic, and challenging when 
some links of identity clash with claims to give singularity its due. It is 
precisely at that point that the dialectic between the universal and the 
singular is unleashed and that it becomes oriented to the plural. Moreo-
ver, because conceptions of the universal are plural, and those of the 
needs for purposes of preserving singularity are multiple, what qualifies 
as the plural is likely to remain perpetually in question. In view of this, 
my project is to account as best as possible for the place and role of 
constitutions, constitutional subjects, and constitutional identities under 
such prevailing circumstances. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having had the privilege of grappling with the thoughtful and inci-
sive insights of the generous group of authors who commented on my 
book, to whom I have attempted to respond as best I could, I ended up 
both reassured and humbled. I feel that for all its frailties underscored 
by my critics, my main thesis regarding the constitutional subject and 
constitutional identity remains viable and coherent. At the same time, 
much work remains to deepen and expand the analysis and properly 
factor in constantly evolving circumstances. The constitutional subject 
is inextricably linked to equality and democracy, but as all three con-
cepts are essentially contested, many issues remain open and call for 
further investigation. Furthermore, the question of the proper level of 
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 For an account of the salient features of these two ethics and of the principal differences 
between them, see id. at 251–96. 
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abstraction for optimal processing of the complex, multifaceted, and 
evolving events and factors that contribute to the making and unmaking 
of plausible iterations of constitutional identity is one that requires unin-
terrupted attention. The constitutional subject proves capable of coming 
in many shapes and sizes, but separating the plausible from the implau-
sible remains a constant challenge. Finally, the dialectic between the 
universal, the singular, and the plural seems to remain a constant, but 
keeping up with its vicissitudes and unexpected turns requires vigilance 
and unremitting attention to the ever-changing details of history and the 
varied potentials and pitfalls of theory. 
